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This paper presents evidence on the fertility effect of welfare from a set of reforms that took place in 
the UK in 1999 and that substantially increased support for poorer families with children.  The reforms, 
including the introduction of the Working Families Tax Credit and an increase in means-tested income 
support, raised benefits by up to 10 per cent of household income.  We exploit the fact that the reforms 
were targeted on low-income households and use a differences-in-differences approach to evaluate 
their impact on fertility.  A priori, the fertility effect of the reforms is ambiguous because WFTC has 
pro-employment effects.  In practice, these are more important for lone mothers and we therefore focus 
on women in couples where we expect the reforms to have a positive effect on births.  We find that the 
reforms raised the probability of birth among women in couples by around 10 per cent (implying an 
elasticity of 0.22).  In line with previous work, the effect is greatest for first births.   
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1  Introduction 
There has been considerable interest in the effect of welfare on fertility.  Much of the 
existing evidence comes from the US where studies have typically exploited variation 
in programme generosity and timing of implementation across states to identify an 
effect. In general, the US evidence finds that more generous welfare is associated with 
increased births (see Moffitt, 1998), although the results are sensitive to specification. 
This paper presents new evidence on the effect of welfare on fertility from the UK, 
focusing on a set of reforms to benefits for families with children introduced in 1999.  
The Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC), similar in design to the US Earned 
Income Tax Credit (EITC), increased the generosity of benefits for households with 
children where at least one parent worked 16 hours a week or more,
1 while the 
generosity of means-tested Income Support (IS) payments to workless households 
with children also increased.
2  We find that these reforms increased the probability of 
birth by around 10 per cent among women in couples, equivalent to nearly 20,000 
births in the post-reform period for these families.   
The UK makes a good case study because of the sheer scale of the reforms.  Between 
1999 and 2003, government spending per child increased by 50 per cent in real terms, 
a change that was unprecedented over the previous thirty year period.  Most of the 
additional spending was targeted at low-income households.  For the poorest one-fifth 
of couples with children, the additional amount of benefit they received for their first 
child was equivalent to a ten per cent increase in their income.  Since the main aims of 
                                                 
1 The reforms have been extensively documented elsewhere.  For further details, see Brewer et al 
(2006), Francesconi and van der Klaauw (2007), Gregg and Harkness (2003) and Leigh (2007).  
2 Total UK births were 645,000 in 2005   4 
the reforms were to improve work incentives (in the case of WFTC) and to bring 
about a reduction in child poverty, there was no pro-natalist intention and therefore 
little concern about policy endogeneity in examining the effect of the reform on 
fertility (see Besley and Case, 2000). Given the similarity in design between the 
WFTC and the EITC, the results from our analysis of the UK reforms will be highly 
relevant to the US.    
The employment effects of WFTC have been extensively analysed (see inter alia 
Blundell et al, 2005, Brewer et al, 2006, Gregg and Harkness, 2003, Francesconi and 
van der Klauuw, 2007 and Leigh, 2007).  Similar to the US studies of EITC (see Eissa 
and Leibman, 1996, Eissa and Hoynes, 2004), these studies find a significant increase 
in employment among lone parents, but little effect on the employment of women in 
couples, with a number suggesting that the additional income from WFTC might have 
caused some women with employed partners to leave work.  There has been far less 
analysis of the impact of the UK reforms on fertility.  Yet this is an important, if 
possibly unintended, consequence of the reforms.  Moreover, most existing analyses 
of the employment effects of welfare-to-work assume that fertility is exogenous 
without explicitly testing this assumption.  
The only previous study of WFTC to consider fertility, Francesconi and van der 
Klauuw (2007), focused on lone mothers and found a (statistically insignificant) 
reduction in the probability of lone mothers having another child after the reforms.  
However, as we argue below, the fertility incentives are not unambiguously positive 
for this group because the increase in employment could cause a reduction in fertility 
by raising the opportunity cost of an additional child.  In our analysis, we focus on 
couples where the likely positive fertility effects are stronger.     5 
Since the reforms were nation-wide, we cannot follow the US studies in identifying 
the policy effect from variation across state and time.  Instead, we exploit the fact that 
the reforms were targeted at low-income households and adopt the commonly-used 
difference-in-difference approach (see Angrist and Krueger, 1999).  We look at the 
change in fertility before and after the reform for couples who were affected by the 
reform and use the change in fertility over the same period for couples unaffected by 
the reform to control for other (unobservable) time-varying effects.  While this 
methodology cannot precisely disentangle individual policy effects, Ellwood (1999) 
argues that it presents powerful and straightforward evidence on behavioural impacts.  
We discuss our definition of the two groups, as well as some potential problems with 
this approach in section 6. 
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows.  The following section summarizes 
the previous literature in this area.  Section 3 describes the UK reforms in further 
detail, and section 4 discusses the possible effect of the reforms on the incentives to 
have children.  Sections 5 and 6 describe the data we use and our empirical strategy.  
Section 7 presents the results of regression analysis and section 8 offers some 
conclusions.   
2  Previous research 
According to a basic economic model of fertility (see Becker, 1991), more generous 
government support for children would tend to raise the desired number of children 
through both a positive income effect
3 and a positive own price effect.  There is a 
large US literature that tries to test this prediction, much of it focusing on Aid to 
                                                 
3 Alternatively, it has been argued that higher income is associated with demand for increased quality 
of children, implying a possible reduction in quantity demanded.   6 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), a welfare programme targeted at lone 
parents (see Moffit, 1998, for an overview).  Identification in studies of AFDC 
typically relies on variation in generosity across states and, although there is clearly a 
positive statistically significant correlation between welfare generosity and fertility, 
the results are sensitive to methodology and in particular, the inclusion of state fixed 
effects and trends (see Hoynes, 1997).   
Of particular relevance to the UK 1999 reforms, a recent paper by Baughman and 
Dickert-Conlin (2003) looks at the effect of EITC on fertility.  Focusing on first births 
and on women with less than college education, who are likely to be more affected by 
the reforms, they exploit variation in state EITC payments to identify an effect.  They 
control for state fixed effects and time-varying policy and economic variables, but not 
state trends.  Overall, they find that more generous EITC benefits have a negative 
effect on first births, although this is statistically insignificant.  But they find a 
positive effect for married women.  As in previous US studies, they find a larger 
effect for non-whites.  
A number of studies have looked at the effect of other forms of government support 
on childbearing.  Whittingdon et al (1990) find a significant fertility effect of changes 
in the personal tax exemption for dependents in the US, with an implied elasticity of 
between 0.127 and 0.248.  For the UK, Ermisch (1988) finds a significant effect of 
child benefit payments on third and fourth births.  However, in these studies, which 
exploit variation in levels of support over time, clearly identifying the effect of 
reforms from the effect of other (unobservable) time-varying factors is a potential 
issue.   
Finally, a number of studies have looked at the effect of explicitly pro-natalist policies.    7 
A recent example, Milligan (2005) studied the effect of the Allowance for Newborn 
Children (ANC), introduced in Quebec in 1998, which paid 500 Canadian dollars for 
the first birth, $1,000 for a second birth (split into two annual payments) and up to 
$8,000 for a third birth (split into twenty quarterly payments).  Using a difference-in-
difference approach, he found a positive and significant effect on fertility, compared 
to the rest of Canada, raising fertility by 12% in the case of first births and 25% in the 
case of third and subsequent births.  He estimated that a $Can 1,000 increase in 
government support in the first year would increase the probability of having a child 
by 16.9%.  Perhaps surprisingly, he found a bigger effect for higher income families.  
However, in cases such as these, the estimated fertility effects may be biased by 
possible policy endogeneity.   
3  The UK reforms 
In 1997, the incoming Labour government initiated a series of policy reforms aimed at 
reducing child poverty.  As discussed in the papers on WFTC cited earlier, a key 
element was to “make work pay” for low-earning families.  Drawing extensively on 
the experience of welfare-to-work programmes in North America, WFTC was 
introduced in October 1999 to provide improved work incentives for families with 
children, together with a number of additional programmes, such as the New Deal for 
Lone Parents, offering training and other help with finding a job.  Alongside this, 
however, the government also increased the generosity of means-tested income 
support payments to families with children. In this section we describe first the WFTC 
reform, and then the contemporaneous changes to welfare benefits and income tax,   8 
before finally analysing how the combined package of reforms affected the incomes 
of families with children.
4   
In essence, WFTC represented a dramatic expansion of an existing, small in-work 
cash support programme known as Family Credit (FC).  Both WFTC and FC required 
recipients to work for at least 16 hours per week, and the credit was tapered away 
with household
5 earnings (plus some other forms of income) above a threshold.  But 
WFTC was more generous in five ways: Credits were higher, particularly for those 
with younger children; families could earn more before the credit began to be 
withdrawn; the rate at which the credit was withdrawn was lower; support for formal 
childcare was more generous; and WFTC excluded child maintenance payments from 
its definition of income.
6  Figure 1 (from Brewer, 2001) compares the WFTC 
schedule with that of the US equivalent, EITC, for the fiscal year 2000.  It shows, 
compared with EITC, the absence of a phase-in portion for WFTC, the greater 
generosity of WFTC (at PPP rates) and the steeper phase-out of WFTC.  
 
      
 
                                                 
4  This discussion draws on Brewer and Browne (2006) and Brewer et al (2006).  We do not describe 
the further set of reforms that took place after April 2003 for further details see Brewer (2003). 
5 The assessment was made on the basis of couple’s earnings even in the case of cohabiting as opposed 
to married couples. 
6 There was no attempt to present these reforms as revenue neutral: annual expenditure on FC/WFTC 
almost doubled between 1998–99 and 2000–01, going from £2.68 billion to £4.81 billion in constant 
2002 prices, with a further increase by 2002 to £6.46 billion.   9 
Figure 1 
WFTC and EITC schedules compared, 2000 
 
But, the introduction of WFTC was not the whole story; there are other income tax 
allowances and transfer programmes available to families with children during the 
period under consideration, and most saw some change. Child benefit, a cash benefit 
available to all families with children regardless of income, saw an increase in the 
amount paid in respect of the first child; welfare benefits for families on a low income 
and working less than 16 hours a week saw considerable increases in the amounts 
paid in respect of children, and a small non-refundable income tax credit for parents 
was introduced in 2001. 
Overall, the combined set of welfare reforms amounted to a big increase in the total 
package of state-provided child-contingent cash support (whether provided through 
cash benefits, in-work tax credits or income tax deductions): central government 
spending on all child-contingent support programmes rose by 50 per cent in real terms 
between 1999 and 2003 (Adam and Brewer, 2004). But the change was far more 
important for low-income families than better-off families, because the rise in   10 
spending was dominated by WFTC and the higher welfare benefits for families with 
children.   
Figure 2 shows the changes in benefits as a proportion of (pre-reform) net family 
income, by deciles of income (adjusted for family composition) for couples with one 
child and for couples with two or more children. This makes it clear that the 
introduction of WFTC was the most important single element in terms of raising the 
incomes of families with children.  It also highlights how the effects of the changes 
were concentrated among poorer households.  For those in the bottom fifth of the 
income distribution, the rise in child-contingent support meant increases in net income 
of around 10 per cent for those with one child, and over 12 per cent for those with two 
or more children.    11 
Figure 2 
Increase in child-contingent benefits, 1998 – 2002  
Couples, one child 
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4.  The impact on fertility 
In principle, the set of reforms that raised government support for families with 
children could impact on the desired number of children through the following 
channels:  
•  Families who are eligible for WFTC or income support will experience a 
positive income effect which, if children are a normal good, will increase the 
demand for the quantity of children.   
•  The increase in child-contingent benefits
7 will lower the own price of an 
additional child for eligible women, increasing the demand for children.   
•  For women on the taper of the WFTC schedule, the fall in net wages will 
reduce the opportunity cost of an additional child and this will also increase 
the demand for children.   
•  Fraser (2001) argues that government support, such as through WFTC or 
income support, can also act to reduce income volatility and this will tend to 
increase the demand for children. 
•  But, for women who are induced to move into, or increase, employment by the 
introduction of WFTC (potentially anyone below the minimum threshold 
shown in Figure 1), the opportunity cost of an additional child will be higher
8 
and this will reduce the demand for children.   
                                                 
7 Including the increase in support with payments for childcare 
8 This is likely to be particularly the case since employees typically have fewer maternity rights during 
their first year of employment at a firm.   13 
In summary, there are positive impacts on fertility through price, income and 
insurance effects, and ambiguous impacts through the employment (or opportunity 
cost) effect. It is therefore vital to consider how the direction of the employment 
effect might vary between different sorts of mothers. 
For lone mothers whose eligibility for WFTC is assessed at the individual level, the 
labour market participation effects of WFTC are unambiguously positive.  Lone 
mothers working more than 16 hours prior to the reform will face a positive income 
effect and a negative substitution effect, which may cause them to reduce their hours, 
but the 16-hour condition in WFTC ensures that labour supply does not fall to zero.  
All of the studies that look at the effect of WFTC on participation, summarized in 
Table 1, find a positive and significant effect of WFTC on the employment of this 
group.  
For women in couples who are the secondary earner (as is typically the case), the 
reform also has a positive income effect and a negative substitution effect on 
participation, but in this case, the woman may reduce her hours below 16 or leave the 
labour market altogether if the family will continue to be eligible for WFTC on the 
basis of her partner’s participation.  Fewer studies have looked at the impact of 
WFTC on women in couples, but most of those that do, summarized in Table 1, 
suggest a small reduction in participation among women with employed partners, and 
a small positive effect for (the small group of) women with unemployed partners. 
9 
                                                 
9 The reforms other than WFTC mentioned in section 3 would have had very small impacts on 
participation of mothers in couples, and would have worked in the same direction, ie to discourage 
labour market participation for women in couples.    14 
Crucially, then, the positive employment effect of WFTC (which would lead to 
reduced fertility) is much less prevalent for women in couples than for lone mothers, 
and hence a positive impact of WFTC on fertility will be stronger for women in 
couples. We therefore focus on this group in our analysis. 
Table 1 
The employment effects of WFTC – summary of evidence 
Study  Methodology  Lone parents  Couples 
 
Blundell et al (2000)  Use estimates from 
structural model to 
simulate likely response; 
looks only at initial (Oct 
99) levels of WFTC 
2.2 ppt increase in 
employment of lone 
mothers 
0.6 ppt reduction in 
employment for 
women with employed 
partners 
Gregg and Harkness 
(2003) 
Apply DD methodology 
(with propensity score 
matching) to Household 
Labour Force Survey data 
1992 – 2002  
5 ppt increase in 
employment of lone 
parents 
 
Leigh (2007)  DD model using panel 
data from the Quarterly 
Labour Force Survey 
1999 – 2000  
1 ppt increase in 
employment among 
lone parents 
1 ppt increase in 
employment among 
women in couples  
Blundell et al (2005)  Estimate DD model using 
Labour Force Survey data 
1996 – 2002  
3.6 ppt increase in 
employment of lone 
mothers working 16+ 
hours a week 
2.6 ppt increase in 
employment of women 
with unemployed 
partners; no effect for 
women with employed 
partners 
Brewer et al (2006)  Estimate structural model 
using Family Resources 
Data 1995 – 2003  
5.1 ppt increase in 
employment of lone 
mothers 
0.6 ppt reduction in 
employment for 
women with employed 
partners, 0.1 ppt 
increase for women 
with non-employed 
partners, 0.6 ppt 
reduction for all 
women. 
Francesconi and van 
der Klauuw (2007) 
Estimate DD model using 
British Household Panel 
Survey data 1991 – 2002 
7 ppt increase in 
employment of lone 
mothers working 16+ 
hours a week 
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5  Data 
We combine data from the Family Resources Survey (FRS) and the Family 
Expenditure Survey (FES) between 1995 and 2003.  The main reason for choosing 
these surveys, as well as the fact that they contain extensive and comparable socio-
demographic information, is their size.  Both are large repeated cross-section datasets 
interviewing, respectively, over 20,000 and 7,000 households each year, which 
together yield over 800 births each year, with interview dates spread roughly equally 
across the year.  While potentially attractive as a panel, the British Household Panel 
Survey (used by Francesconi and van der Klauw, 2007) has fewer than 150 births a 
year.  The FRS and FES do not explicitly collect information about births or women’s 
fertility.  But we derive the probability that a woman had a birth in the previous 
twelve months from children’s date of birth
10 and the date of interview after allocating 
all children in the household to their natural mothers on the basis of information on 
household composition.  Using this approach, we also determine the number and ages 
of the children in the household twelve months before interview.   
This approach (the so-called “own child method”) can be used to derive approximate 
fertility histories for the women in the sample going back beyond the date of 
interview (see Murphy et al, 1993).   But it is not without problems.  First, the 
estimated birth probabilities are potentially subject to measurement error due to infant 
mortality and household reconstitution.  However, low rates of mortality and the fact 
that the overwhelming majority of children stay with their natural mother in the event 
of family break-up reduce the effect of these factors in practice.   
                                                 
10 Where this is not available, we assign a randomly allocated date of birth based on the child’s age 
and the interview date.   16 
Second, an issue that affects information on the number and ages of existing children 
at the start of the twelve-month period (but not information on births during that 
period) is that older women may have had children who have now left home.  Our 
solution is to censor the sample of women at age 37, since the problem seems to have 
a significant effect after this age.
11  We test the sensitivity of our results to this 
restriction.   
As a check on the validity of our data, we compare estimates of the period total 
fertility rate
12 for all women derived from the FES/FRS with the official measure of 
total fertility derived by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) from registration data.  
This is shown in Figure 3 below, using the derived fertility histories from the 
FES/FRS to estimate total fertility back to 1968.  The main long-term trends in 
fertility can clearly be seen, including the UK’s own baby boom peaking in 1964 at 
2.94, and the subsequent decline.  There is some evidence of rising fertility towards 
the end of the period.  Total fertility estimated using the FES/FRS tracks the official 
measure quite closely.  The average difference is only 0.12 births and the two 
measures follow similar trends over the period. 
For our analysis, we select women aged 20-37 who are in a couple at the time of 
interview (including married and cohabiting couples).  The final sample contains over 
53,000 observations.  Key summary statistics are presented for this sub-sample, as 
well as the sample of all women, in Table 2.    
                                                 
11 We estimated the probability that women had a birth at age 17 using pooled data on women aged 30 
or more and including dummies for the age at interview:   38 was the first age at which the age dummy 
was significant.   
12 This is measured as the total number of children a woman would have over her (reproductive) 
lifetime, if she experienced the age-specific birth rates in a particular year   17 
Figure 3 





  All women aged 
20-37 
Women in couples 
aged 20-37 
No. observations  86,234  53,142 
Mean age  28.39  29.58 
Proportion with birth in previous 12 months  0.088  0.120 
Mean number of children  1.03  1.22 
Left school at minimum school leaving age  0.467  0.461 
Left full-time education after age 18  0.246  0.271 
Proportion black  0.027  0.016 
Proportion asian  0.043  0.048 
Proportion other ethnic group  0.020  0.019 
 
6  Empirical strategy 
We would like to measure the effect of the reforms on the number of children among 
those women who are affected by the reform, i.e.:   18 
E(N1 – N1’ | T = 1) = E(N1 | T = 1) – E(N1’ | T = 1) 
where N1 is the actual number of children within the group affected by the reform (the 
treatment group, T = 1) and N1’ is the number of children they would have had in the 
absence of the reform. 
Of course, E (N1’ | T = 1) is not known since there is no way of knowing how many 
children the treatment group would have had in the absence of the reform.  The idea 
behind the difference in difference approach is to use the change in fertility over the 
same period of a control group to proxy for the change that otherwise would have 
occurred within the treatment group in the absence of the reform.  Applying this 
change to the initial fertility level of the treatment group gives an estimate of E (N1’ | 
T = 1). 
The DD approach therefore measures the following: 
[E(N1 | T = 1) – E(N0 | T = 1)] – [E (N1 | T = 0) – E(N0 | T = 0)] 
where N0 is the number of children prior to the reform and T = 0 contains the control 
group who are unaffected by the reform.   
To identify the effect of the reforms, we exploit the fact that they were targeted at 
low-income households to define a treatment group who were affected by the reform, 
and a control group who were not. 
Since eligibility for WFTC (and income support) was based on household earnings, 
an obvious choice is to split the population into treatment and control groups on the 
basis of earnings (see Table 3 for details of the split used).  The advantage is that 
household earnings are likely to be strongly correlated with the reform’s impact, at 
least in the short-term.  But, earnings are likely to be endogenous and affected by the   19 
reform because of its impact on both employment and fertility.  Furthermore, current 
earnings may be correlated with transitory shocks, while we would expect the impact 
of the reform to be greater for households with permanently low earnings.
13   
Table 3 
Treatment and control groups – definitions  
  Treatment  Control 
Household earnings  Bottom third of household 
earnings distribution 
Top third of household 
earnings distribution 
Education  Both male and female partner 
left school at/before 
compulsory school leaving age 
Both male and female partner 
left school at 18+ 
Earnings and education  Education treatment and 
income treatment 
Education control and income 
control 
     
 
Instead of earnings, education of both partners (and/or of just the woman) can be used 
as a time-invariant proxy for income to define treatment and control groups (details of 
the split given in Table 3).  In the short-term at least, we can assume that education 
choices will be unaffected by the reform.  Compared to earnings, the potential 
disadvantage of using education is that it is less strongly correlated with the impact of 
the reform.  However, as shown in Table 4, the education split does well in picking up 
the differential impact of the reforms. 
                                                 
13 Of course, this is true only if households expect the reforms to be permanent, or at least to have a 
permanent effect on the level of child-contingent benefits.   20 
Table 4 
Receipt of child-contingent benefits 
  Split by education  Split by earnings  Split by education/ 
earnings 
  Control  Treatment  Control  Treatment  Control  Treatment 
Proportion entitled to 
FC/WFTC or IS 
         
Before  .098  .237  .125  .354  .000  .441 
After  .141  .401  .175  .586  .006  .732 
Mean weekly entitlement 
FC/WFTC, IS + child benefit 
         
Before  £29.71  £39.00  £32.38  £47.49  £20.92  £54.06 
After  £37.27  £56.76  £41.02  £72.02  £24.70  £83.80 












Authors’ calculations based on estimated entitlements to welfare programmes, FC and WFTC, 
calculated using TAXBEN, the IFS’ tax and benefit calculator. 
 
 
Finally, we also define treatment and control groups on the basis of education and 
household earnings to pick up households who are likely to have permanently low 
incomes (see Table 3 for details of the split).  As shown in Table 4, the difference 
between the control and treatment groups is most pronounced for this variant.     
Identifying the effect of the reform relies crucially on successfully controlling for 
everything else that might affect the fertility of the treatment group after the reform.  
In our regression analysis we include a rich set of demographic controls, including 
age, education, numbers and ages of children in the household, region, housing tenure 
and ethnicity.  In principle, the inclusion of the control group is intended to capture 
the effect of other (unobservable) time-varying factors.  But, the control group may 
differ to the treatment group, both in the level of their fertility (which the differencing 
takes care of) and, more problematically, in trends in their fertility (see Ratcliffe and 
Smith, 2006).  Our analysis focuses on a relatively narrow window (four years before   21 
and four years after the reform’s implementation), which should reduce the bias 
arising from differential trends, but we also explicitly allow for differential trends in 
the regression.  Using the women’s imputed fertility histories, we can extend the 
before period to get better identification of the differential trends; we also try 
estimating the effect of spurious reforms to test the sensitivity of our results.  As well 
as allowing for differential linear trends, we also include the 25
th and 75
th percentile 
of the female and male wage distributions (matched to the treatment and control 
groups) to control for (non-linear) differential macro-economic effects.        
As already noted, the DD methodology cannot precisely disentangle individual policy 
effects (such as separating the effect of WFTC from that of changes to income 
support).  It will also include other reforms introduced at the same time that affected 
the fertility of the treatment group (and not the control group).  In fact, a number of 
changes were made to maternity rights and child-care provision that may have 
affected fertility, including extensions to maternity leave and increases in free nursery 
provision.
14 In principle, all women were affected by these reforms, but in practice, 
the impact may have been greater for women in the low education group if they 
previously had less generous maternity provisions in their employment, and were less 
able to afford childcare.  If so, then our DD estimate will also include the differential 
effect of these other reforms.  We would argue, however, that the effects of these 
reforms is likely to be small compared to the impact of WFTC and the changes to 
income support.     
In principle, we would like to measure the effect of the reforms on the total number of 
children over the fertility lifetime of affected cohorts.  This would include older 
                                                 
14 See Hills and Waldfogel (2004) for a summary.   22 
cohorts, who are likely to have already started their family formation process at the 
time of the reform, as well as younger cohorts who make all their fertility decisions 
facing the post-reform financial incentives.  In practice, we do not have sufficient 
number of years’ data after the reform to look at completed fertility for affected 
cohorts.  Also, even if the data were available, it would be hard to attribute changes in 
fertility across cohorts separated by several years to a discrete policy reform.    
In practice, therefore, we define the variable of interest as the probability of having a 
birth during the previous year, and compare the changes in these birth probabilities 
before and after the reform for the treatment and control groups.  Since we can define 
birth probabilities immediately before and after the reform, we will be able to identify 
any effect more easily (compared to looking at changes in cohort completed family 
size).  However, we cannot separate out changes in the timing of births (ie people 
choosing to have their children earlier in their lifetimes) from changes in the total 
number of births, although we investigate whether there have been changes in the age 
at first birth.   
A final issue relates to the definition of the “before” and “after” periods in 
determining the effect of the reform.  WFTC was announced in March 1998 and 
introduced in October 1999.  Assuming no announcement effects, the reform would 
first have affected births from August 2000.  We therefore include women 
interviewed between 1
st April 1995 and 30
th June 2000
15 in the before sample, and 
women interviewed between 1
st August 2001 and 31
st December 2003 in the after 
sample.  For women interviewed between 1
st July 2000 and 31
st July 2001, the 
                                                 
15 We choose end of June rather than end of July to allow for premature births   23 
introduction of the reform (plus nine months) occurs in the middle of the twelve 
month period prior to their interview and so they are omitted from the analysis.   
What if there is an effect arising from announcement?  This could increase births in 
the immediate before period if women respond to the announcement of the reforms 
rather than (or as well as) their implementation.  This is not implausible – so long as 
the increase in benefits is credible, then the loss arising from the gap between 
announcement and implementation would be relatively small compared to the 
expected increase in benefits over the child’s lifetime.  Alternatively, women could 
decide after announcement to delay childbearing until after the reforms were 
implemented, which would tend to decrease births in the immediate before period 
(similar to “Ashenfelter’s dip”, see Ashenfelter, 1978).  We test the sensitivity of our 
results to announcement effects by trimming the before sample at 31
st December 1998 
(nine months after the reform was announced).   
7  Regression results 
The outcome of interest is a binary variable equal to one if the woman had a birth in 
the previous twelve months, and equal to zero otherwise (Birth).  The basic 
difference-in-difference specification includes a binary variable “low” equal to one if 
the individual belongs to the (low-education, low-income or low-education/income) 
treatment group, a binary variable “post” equal to one in the post-reform period, and 
an interaction term, low * post, which captures the difference in the change in the 
level of fertility after the reform for the treatment group (compared to the control 
group), our estimate of the effect of the reform.  We include an additional interaction 
with a dummy for whether the woman has children at the beginning of the twelve-
month period to allow the effect of the reform to vary by those with and without   24 
children. We also allow for the treatment and control groups to have different trends 
in their fertility.  This leads to the following empirical specification:  
( ) ( )
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Xit is a vector of characteristics which are assumed to affect fertility.  These include a 
cubic in the woman’s age (at the start of the twelve month period), interacted with 
education; the number of children in the household (at the start of the twelve month 
period), interacted with the woman’s age and with the woman’s age and education 
and with the age of the youngest child; region and housing tenure; woman’s and 
partner’s ethnicity and the 25
th and 75
th percentiles in the female and male hourly 
wage distribution.  We include ethnicity as a control, but unlike US studies, we do not 
test for a differential response across ethnic groups, largely because of small sample 
sizes.  We estimate this equation using a probit regression and report the average 
estimated marginal treatment effects for a number of different specifications in Table 
5.  A full set of results for the education split, including all the control variables, is 
given in the Appendix.      
The results provide consistent support for an effect of the reforms on the fertility of 
the treatment group.  Controlling for a wide range of other factors, this group 
experienced a (relative) increase in fertility following the reforms, which is 
statistically significant in most specifications. 
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Table 5 
Probit regression results, average marginal effects 
Dependent variable = had a birth in the previous 12 months 






(3) Earnings split 
Women, 20-37 
(4) Earnings/ educ 
split 
Women, 20-37 
(a) No Announcement effects             
















Treatment * kids    -.0153 
(.0161) 
  -.0109 
(.0082) 
  -.0048 
(.0151) 
  -.0111 
(.0200) 
N  19,950  19,950  30,268  30,268  24,943  24,943  12,782  12,782 
(b) Announcement effects               
















Treatment * kids    -.0163 
(.0121) 
  -.0098 
(.0085) 
  -.0074 
(.0124) 
  -.0159 
(.0199) 
N  18,555  18,555  28,157  28,157  23,108  23,108  11,805  11,805 
(c) No announcement effects, excluding trend terms 
















Treatment * kids    -.0137 
(.0119) 
  -.0106 
(.0082) 
  -.0045 
(.0123) 
  -.0102 
(.0201) 
N  19,950  19,950  30,268  30,268  24,943  24,943  12,782  12,782 
Notes to table 
** indicates coefficient is statistically significant at the 5% level, * at the 10% level 
Sample is women in couples.  Treatment refers to the treatment group in the post-reform period.  
Regressions include a dummy for the post-reform period and a full set of controls for age of mother, 
education, age and number of children in the household, region, housing tenure and ethnicity.  See 
Appendix for a full set of results.   
 
The magnitude of the estimated effect ranges from 1.2 – 3.6 percentage points 
depending on the specification.  As expected, the effect is greater when the treatment 
group is defined in terms of earnings and earnings/education interactions since this 
split is more closely correlated with the reforms’ impact.  However, as already 
discussed, there is a concern about the potential endogeneity of household earnings, 
whereas the split by education is unaffected by the reform.   
The results in column (2) confirm that the findings are not driven by selecting on   26 
women aged 20 – 37, which might be the case if educated women experienced a 
stronger trend towards later childbearing.  Including women up to age 45, the results 
are broadly similar and the larger sample size is associated with greater statistical 
significance.  The results allowing for announcement effects, shown in panel (b) are 
also broadly similar.   
Panel (c) shows that the magnitude of the coefficients is sensitive to including trend 
terms.  In general, although the effect of the reform is still positive, the coefficients 
are smaller and typically insignificant.  As a further robustness check, we use the 
derived fertility histories
16 to extend the pre-reform period back to 1985.  Table 6, 
column (1) shows the results using the longer pre-period to capture the differential 
trends in fertility, while columns (2) and (3) show the results of modelling the effects 
of spurious reforms in 1995 and 1996.  The estimated effect using the longer pre-
reform is smaller, but is statistically significant.  Moreover, the results from the 
estimates including the spurious reforms confirm that the change in fertility lines up 
with the introduction of the actual reforms in 1999.       
                                                 
16 Based on the number and ages of the children in the household, we estimate birth probabilities for 
each woman in the sample at each age (and derive information on the number and ages of the children 
in the household).  For further information, see Ratcliffe and Smith (2006)   27 
Table 6 
Allowing for a longer pre-reform period 
Dependent variable = had a birth in the previous 12 months 
(1) 
Actual reform, 1999 
(2) 
Spurious reform, 1995 
(2)  
Spurious reform, 1996 
Education split 
Women, 20-27  
Coeff  SE  Coeff  SE  Coeff  SE 
Treatment  .0069*  .0039  .0013  .0034  .0021  .0035 
N  563,929    474,821    479,564   
* indicates coefficient is significant at the 10% level 
Sample is women in couples.  Treatment refers to the treatment group in the post-reform period. 
Regressions include a common dummy for the post-reform period, a trend, interacted with education 
and with the post-reform dummy, controls for age of mother, education, age and number of children in 
the household, region and housing tenure. 
Standard errors adjusted for clustering since multiple observations on each woman are not independent 
Spurious reform, 1995: Before = Apr 85 – Mar 95; After = Apr 96 – Mar 99 
Spurious reform, 1996: Before = Apr 85 – Mar 96; After = Apr 97 – Mar 99 
 
The results in table 5 show that the effect of the reforms was stronger for women who 
did not already have children.  Table 7 explores this further by looking at the effects 
according the number of children already present in the household and the age of the 
youngest child, both at the start of the twelve months.  The results show that the 
biggest effect was on the first and third births, and also that the reforms had less of an 
effect for households whose youngest child was aged three or less, or aged eight or 
over.     
A bigger effect for first births is consistent with the fact that benefits increased by 
more for first births than for second and subsequent births.  However, previous studies 
have also found a stronger effect of financial incentives on first births.  Laroque and 
Salanie (2005), for example, find a stronger effect of the French Allocation Parentale 
d’Education on first births even though the actual financial incentives were triggered 
by second or higher births.  In the case of women with very young children, the lack 
of an effect may correspond to a natural break between births, and this is supported by   28 
the results by age of youngest child.  But, it may also reflect the effect of strong 
underlying preferences for two children.  If so, the decision whether to have children 
(or at least when to begin having them) may be more susceptible to financial 
incentives than the decision over how many to have, once childbearing has begun.   
Table 7 
Allowing for differential response by number and age of kids 
Dependent variable = had a birth in the previous 12 months 
(1) Presence of kids  (2) Number of kids  (3) Age of youngest  Education split 
Women, 20-27   Coeff  SE  Coeff  SE  Coeff  SE 
Treatment  0.0294  0.0169*  0.0294  0.0169*  0.0294  0.0169* 
T * kids   -0.0153  0.0161         
T * 1 kid      -0.0191  0.0134     
T * 2 kid      -0.0058  0.0154     
T * 3 or more kids      -0.0188  0.0176     
T * youngest_01          -0.0262  0.0144* 
T * youngest_23          -0.0177  0.0151 
T * youngest_45          -0.0061  0.0189 
T * youngest_67          -0.0027  0.0247 
T * youngest_89          -0.0183  0.0259 
T * youngest_10+          -0.0218  0.0319 
N  19,950    19,950    19,950   
** indicates coefficient is significant at the 5% level; * at the 10% level 
Sample is women in couples.  Treatment refers to the treatment group in the post-reform period. 
Regressions allow for differential trends and include a common post-reform dummy and a full set of 
controls for age of mother, education, age and number of children in the household, region, housing 
tenure and ethnicity.  
 
Finally, we investigate whether treatment impacts vary by the age of the woman.  
Purely on biological grounds it might be expected that some differences may exist in 
fertility responses to financial incentives by age.  Also, women of different ages will 
be at different stages in the fertility lifetimes at the time of the reform.  However, the 
results, given in Table 8, show no significant difference between responses among 
women aged 30+ (the base treatment group), those aged 20-24 and those aged 25-29.   29 
Table 8 
Allowing for differential response by woman’s age 
Dependent variable = had a birth in the previous 12 months 
Education split 
Women, 20-37  
Coeff  SE 
Treatment  0.0166  .0149 
T * 20-24   0.0039  .0157 
T * 25-29   0.0027  .0137 
N  19,950   
Sample is women in couples. Treatment refers to the treatment group in the post-reform period. 
Regressions allow for differential trends and include a common post-reform dummy and a full set of 
controls for age of mother, education, age and number of children in the household, region, housing 
tenure and ethnicity. 
 
The estimated positive effect of the reforms may reflect women beginning 
childbearing earlier and bringing forward births they otherwise would have had later 
on.  In this case, the overall increase in births will be smaller than our estimated 
coefficients suggest.  However, we do not find that the reforms had a significant effect 
on age at first birth.  For women who have had children, we regress age at first birth 
(estimated using information on the number and ages of children in the household) on 
a set of controls for education, region, housing tenure and ethnicity.  We include a full 
set of date of birth cohorts, and interact these with education, and allow for 
differential trends.  The results are reported in Table 9.  For both our selected sample 
and a larger sample of women up to age 45, the coefficient on the low education 
group is actually positive, albeit insignificant.  This suggests that the reforms were 
associated with a genuine increase in births, rather than just a change in timing.   30 
Table 9 
Effect on age at first birth 
Dependent variable = age at first birth 
Education split 
 
Women aged 20-37  Women aged 20-45 




N  14,267  22,865 
Sample is women in couples.  Treatment refers to the treatment group in the post-reform period. 
Regressions allow for differential trends and include a common dummy for the post-reform period, 
controls for cohort of birth (interacted with education), region, housing tenure and ethnicity 
            
Finally, we have focused on women in couples since that is the group where we 
expect to find the greatest effect (because of the pro-employment effects of WFTC for 
lone mothers).  We confirm that this is the case by running a regression on the sample 
of all women.  Since partner information is missing for single women, we split the 
sample on the basis of the woman’s education only.  We define the treatment group to 
be women who left school at the compulsory school leaving age and the control group 
to be women who left school at 18-plus.  The results are reported in Table 10.  While 
neither of the estimated treatment effects is significant, they support our argument that 
the positive effect is more likely for women in couples and indeed the coefficient for 
single women is negative. 
Table 10 
All woman sample 
Dependent variable = had a birth in the previous 12 months 
Education split 
Women, 20-37  
Coeff  SE 
Treatment  -0.0232  .0310 
T*in_couple   0.0353  .0452 
N  47,329   
Sample is all women. Treatment refers to the treatment group in the post-reform period. Regressions 
allow for differential trends by education and for women in couples.  They include dummies for the 
post-reform period, and a full set of controls for age of mother, education, age and number of children 
in the household, region, housing tenure and ethnicity.   31 
8  Discussion and conclusions 
The reforms that took place in the UK in 1999 present an excellent case study for 
addressing the question of whether government support for families with children 
affects fertility, largely because of the scale of the increases.   
We argue that when looking at the impact of welfare-to-work programmes such as 
WFTC and EITC, the overall impact on fertility is ambiguous because of the pro-
employment effects of these programmes.  In practice, however, the effect on fertility 
is likely to vary between women in couples and lone mothers, and is more likely to be 
positive for women in couples.  We provide evidence that this is the case, consistent 
with earlier findings from the US.  These findings imply that it is crucially important 
to estimate fertility effects separately for these different groups of women.   
When we focus on couples, we find evidence that the increase in payments to families 
with children increased the probability of a birth.  This is an important, if unintended 
consequence, of increasing benefits to families with children.  Taking the smallest 
estimated effect, our results indicate that the probability of having a birth increased by 
1.2 percentage points among the low education group, equivalent to a 10 per cent 
increase, or nearly 20,000 additional births.  Since entitlement to benefits increased by 
45 per cent among this group, the implied elasticity is around 0.22.
17  This is towards 
the upper end estimated by Whittingdon, but much smaller than the recent findings of 
Milligan (2005) for the pro-natalist Allowance for Newborn Children in Quebec.  He 
found that the probability of birth increased by 17 per cent for a $Can 1,000 total 
                                                 
17 The implied elasticities based on the income and income/education splits are 0.15 and 0.25 
respectively.  These estimated elasticities assume a zero response among the control group.  Since 
benefits did increase for the control group, but by less, the implied elasticity could be greater in 
practice.     32 
increase in support, whereas, in the UK, the increase in benefits for the low-education 
group was equal to an additional £1,000 each year.  The implied elasticity is greater 
than Baughman and Dickert-Conlin found for EITC in the US.  The difference may be 
attributable to the greater magnitude of the UK reforms.   
Finally, our findings add to the growing body of evidence that the effect of financial 
incentives is likely to vary by birth order, and is typically stronger for first births than 
for subsequent births.  This implies that the reforms had an effect on the fertility 
decisions of households who were not (yet) receiving the benefits (ie those with no 
children).  However, there is supporting evidence of high levels of awareness of the 
new benefits even among those who were not receiving it, which may have come 
about as a result of the extensive television advertising and/or through word-of-mouth.  
A survey carried out for the UK Department for Work and Pensions in summer 2000 
(repeated in summer 2001) found that 33 per cent (42 per cent in 2001) of 
low/moderate-income couples were aware of WFTC although they had never received 
it (McKay, 2000 and 2001).  Given this evidence, we would argue that the first-birth 
effect is not implausible.     33 
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Table A1 
Probit regression results 
Dependent variable = birth in last 12 months 
  Coeff  SE 
Age_highed  -2.554  0.837 
Age_lowed  -0.972  0.572 
Age_1kid_highed  2.712  1.951 
Age_2kids_highed  3.501  3.334 
Age_3+kids_highed  -1.611  9.789 
Age_1kid_lowed  0.711  0.848 
Age_2kids_lowed  2.640  1.118 
Age_3+kids_lowed  1.476  1.757 
Agesq_highed  0.976  0.300 
Agesq_lowed  0.357  0.213 
Agesq_1kid_highed  -1.008  0.675 
Agesq_2kids_highed  -1.288  1.118 
Agesq_3+kids_highed  0.232  3.181 
Agesq_1kid_lowed  -0.247  0.312 
Agesq_2kids_lowed  -0.969  0.399 
Agesq_3+kids_lowed  -0.524  0.612 
Agecubed_highed  -0.118  0.035 
Agecubed_lowed  -0.044  0.026 
Agecubed_1kid_highed  0.121  0.077 
Agecubed_2kids_highed  0.151  0.124 
Agecubed_3+kids_highed  0.003  0.342 
Agecubed_1kid_lowed  0.028  0.038 
Agecubed_2kids_lowed  0.115  0.047 
Agecubed_3+kids_lowed  0.060  0.070 
1kid_highed  -23.090  18.582 
2kids_highed  -30.366  32.887 
3+kids_highed  25.853  99.745 
1kid_lowed  -6.741  7.558 
2kids_lowed  -23.904  10.306 
3+kids_lowed  -14.112  16.656 
1kid,youngestage23  0.497  0.054 
1kid,youngestage45  0.364  0.071 
1kid,youngestage67  0.034  0.093 
1kid,youngestage89  -0.078  0.117 
1kid,youngestage10+  -0.251  0.108 
2kids,youngestage23  0.313  0.067 
2kids,youngestage45  0.171  0.082 
2kids,youngestage67  0.049  0.103 
2kids,youngestage89  -0.033  0.127 
2kids,youngestage10+  -0.159  0.139 
3+kids,youngestage23  0.057  0.099 
3+kids,youngestage45  0.229  0.110 
3+kids,youngestage67  -0.345  0.173 
3+kids,youngestage89  0.063  0.171 
3+kids,youngestage10+  -0.338  0.295 
Region = North East  -0.066  0.072 
Region = North West  0.025  0.054 
Region = Yorks&Humbs  -0.029  0.059 
Region = EastMidlands  0.001  0.058 
Region = WestMidlands  0.013  0.055 
Region = Eastern  0.044  0.058 
Region = SouthEast  0.055  0.052 
Region = SouthWest  0.064  0.057   38 
Region = Wales  0.048  0.068 
Region = Scotland  -0.002  0.055 
Region = Northern Ireland  0.195  0.102 
Tenure = social housing  0.159  0.033 
Tenure = Private rented  -0.156  0.042 
Tenure = other  0.176  0.173 
Black  0.113  0.136 
Asian  0.094  0.133 
Other ethnic group  -0.147  0.124 
Partner = Black  0.096  0.132 
Partner = Asian  0.235  0.133 
Partner = other ethnic group  0.156  0.126 
Female wage  0.069  0.205 
Male wage  -0.116  0.139 
Trend  -0.008  0.014 
Trend * Lowed  -0.006  0.004 
Post  0.007  0.099 
Post * Lowed  0.096  0.068 
N  19,950   
 